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Abstract: Savings and credit cooperatives (SCCs) provide a variety of microfinance services to households in three of Nepal’s distinct regions—the
Hills, Terai, and Kathmandu Valley. Nearly all Nepali SCCs are self-funded
using member savings and equity. Most Nepali SCCs are also profitable,
including those located in poor, remote areas of the Hills region. Key reasons
for the SCCs’ strong financial performance include reliance on member savings and control of administration costs. High-profit SCCs also show superior interest earnings on loans compared to low-profit SCCs. Nepali SCCs
do not need concessionary funds, because they are already profitable and
able to mobilize member savings. While savings-led microfinance in Nepali
SCCs is a slow process, there is significant long-term outreach potential in
local communities. The government and donors should pursue institutionbuilding strategies to strengthen Nepali SCCs and should not provide concessionary funding.

y most indicators, the outlook for economic development and poverty alleviation in Nepal is bleak. Living
standards in the country are among the lowest in the
world and are declining in many categories. The country’s difficult topography poses challenges for market development and
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limits agricultural investment options. The country is currently
plagued by political instability, including a Maoist insurgency. In
addition, formal financial markets fail to reach most poor households. According to one recent estimate (CECI, 2001), only
10% of rural households can access formal financial markets.
Many government and nongovernment agencies implement a
variety of microfinance programs to increase poor households’
access to financial services (Bhatta, 2001).
Nepal’s geography influences the nature of microfinance
programs. The Himalayan mountains cover the northern third
of Nepal. Sparse population and few business activities are
found in this region. The middle third of Nepal—known as the
Hills—contains roughly 40% of the country’s population. In
Hills communities subsistence agriculture is the primary way of
life. Hills topography consists of steep peaks and valleys between
500 and 3,000 meters above sea level. Many Hills communities
are far removed from modern amenities and infrastructure.
The Terai comprises the southern third of Nepal and features
flat, fertile, and densely populated landscapes. In the geographical center of Nepal lies the Kathmandu Valley, the heart of
government and business activities. Existing microfinance programs are mostly concentrated in the Terai and the Kathmandu
Valley (Bhatta, 2001), though some organizations are expanding their activities to the Hills (CECI, 2001).
In general, there is much debate regarding the financial sustainability of microfinance institutions (MFIs). Critics argue that
most MFIs can only cover operating costs under the most optimistic conditions (Hassan, 2002; Morduch, 1999). Sustainability
is especially challenging in Nepal’s Hills. Poor communication
and transportation infrastructures increase administration costs
and complicate routine tasks such as savings and loan collection.
Poverty is widespread in the Hills, so the requirements for
clients’ savings and loan amounts are small. Limited access to
urban markets suggests that microentrepreneurs in this region
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have few options for developing new products. Consequently,
the conventional wisdom among Nepal’s microfinance community is that MFIs in the Terai and Kathmandu Valley find it
comparatively easier to achieve sustainability than MFIs in the
Hills. However, there is no available evidence that either supports or refutes this claim.
One popular type of MFI in Nepal is the community-based
savings and credit organization. Organizations of this type range
from informal dhikuti groups (Seibel & Shrestha, 1988) to
legally recognized savings and credit cooperatives (SCCs).
Nepali SCCs provide financial intermediation between cash-surplus and cash-deficit households. They differ from other MFIs
because they are locally owned and managed. To paraphrase
Ashe and Parrott (2002), Nepali SCCs resemble village banks
without the external funds and structural rigidity typically
imposed by donors. There are presently more than 1,300 SCCs
in Nepal (CECI, 2001). Because these organizations are locally
owned and managed, there is some suggestion that they can provide sustainable microfinance services for Nepal’s poorest rural
communities (CECI, 1998). However, these institutions’ financial status and potential for sustainability is unknown.
This paper examines the financial performance of communitybased SCCs in Nepal and their ability to provide sustainable
microfinance services under various conditions. Special attention is devoted to comparing the SCC performance of Nepal’s
distinct geographic regions—the Hills, Terai, and Kathmandu
Valley. Some factors affecting SCC profitability are also identified. The following section briefly reviews the literature on
MFI sustainability and SCC performance. The section after that
describes the data and methods used in this study. Then Nepali
SCCs’ financial performance is examined and some of the factors
affecting profitability are identified. The next section discusses
the implications for policy makers and the donor community
and assesses Nepali SCCs’ outreach potential. The final section
summarizes the paper’s findings.
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Review of the Literature
Although microfinance programs promote poverty alleviation
and community development (Khandker, 2003; Pitt & Khandker,
1998; Amin, Becker, & Bayes, 1998), there is growing concern
regarding MFIs’ financial sustainability. A recent survey of
seventy-two MFIs shows that only half are profitable even
though all report a “commitment” to financial sustainability
(Microbanking Bulletin, 1998). Morduch (1999) cautions that
these results should not be extrapolated and that, in reality, a
much smaller fraction of MFIs are financially sustainable.
Many “profitable” MFIs also receive concessionary funds and
do not include client training and development costs in their
profit calculations (Hassan, 2002; Yaron, 1994). Bennett,
Goldberg, and Hunte (1996), Schmidt and Zeitinger (1996A),
and Basix and Ramola (1996) provide further examples of MFIs
that fail to achieve financial sustainability.
Many factors affect MFI financial sustainability. The MFI’s
orientation and philosophy, for example, play an important role.
Some authors argue that most nongovernment organizations
(NGOs) are not well suited for sustainability because of their
social orientation (Schmidt & Zeitinger, 1996B; Dichter, 1996).
Microfinance donors are also guilty of ignoring sustainability
issues with their NGO partners (Von Pischke, 1996). The MFI’s
orientation toward profitability affects loan repayment, efficiency, and staff productivity (Yaron, 1994; Schmidt and
Zeitinger, 1996A).
There is also a growing awareness that client ownership and
participation greatly affect MFI performance and sustainability
(Rajasekhar, 1996; Morduch, 1999; Hassan, 2002). Bennett et al.
(1996) cite evidence from five South Asian MFIs to show how
reliance on member savings improves loan repayment and compels management to control costs. Ashe and Parrott (2002) find
that women’s groups in Nepal’s Terai are sustainable because
they are completely financed using member savings. Matthews
and Ali (2002) report similar results for remote communities in
Bangladesh using savings-led microfinance schemes.
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Gender is another potential factor affecting MFI sustainability. Among the challenges for women’s MFIs are that women
generally grow more subsistence crops than men and operate
smaller businesses with low profit margins (Holt & Ribe, 1991).
One study found that women’s SCCs in Nepal generally lack
important inputs such as management systems, organizational
visions, and networks with government and other agencies
(CECI, 1998). On the other hand, women’s groups in Grameentype programs typically show superior loan repayment and are
more efficient (Hassan, 2002; Hassan & Tufte, 2001).
The evidence is mixed regarding SCC performance and
financial sustainability (Huppi & Feder, 1990; Schmidt &
Zeitinger, 1996a). Results from several countries show that SCCs
promote member savings and client-owned structures. SCCs can
also provide accurate information to management about borrowers. However, inefﬁciency, concentrated investment portfolios, and
inadequate savings mobilization from deficit households are
problems frequently found in SCCs. Moral hazard is another
concern since default by a few borrowers encourages widespread default, and because local communities may hesitate to
penalize delinquent borrowers.

Data Description
The Nepal Federation of Savings and Credit Unions (NEFSCUN)
is an apex institution for Nepali SCCs. NEFSCUN’s primary
tasks are SCC advocacy and the provision of development services
to member institutions. There are presently 219 active NEFSCUN members. 1 These SCCs submit annual audited financial
statements and membership data to NEFSCUN. Since this
study examines community-based SCCs and their ability to
implement microfinance activities, district-level SCCs and
SCCs heavily involved in nonfinance activities (such as merchandise trading) are excluded from the sample. The latter
group is defined as any SCC that earns less than 20% of its total
revenue from loan interest and fees. Table 1 describes the sample SCCs used in this study. The extent to which the sample
Volume 6 Number 1
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fairly represents all Nepali SCCs is unknown, though NEFSCUN membership privileges may lead to members’ improved
financial performance over nonmembers. The most motivated
and committed SCCs are also those most likely to join NEFSCUN. Nonetheless, the sample NEFSCUN SCCs are assumed
to represent all of Nepal’s community-based SCCs.
Nepali SCCs have an average membership of 178 people,
making them larger than Ashe and Parrott’s (2002) Terai-based
women’s groups (roughly 20 members each) but much smaller
than most MFIs worldwide. Average total assets are approximately

Table 1. Description of NEFSCUN member SCCs: grouped
by region
Variable

All regions

Hills

Terai

Kathmandu F–test for
Valley
equality of
means
across
regions
(df=2,184)
69

Active NEFSCUN
SCCs

219

89

61

SCCs with missing
or unreliable data

7

4

2

1

District-level SCCs

14

8

5

1

SCCs receiving less
than 20% of their
revenue from loan
interest and fees

13

3

5

5

185

74

49

62

Number of SCCs
in data set

Means (Standard deviation in parentheses)
Age, a years

4.9
(2.4)

5.1
(2.3)

4.3
(2.1)

5.2
(2.7)

2.49

Total assets,b
US$1,000

25.8
(52.0)

23.1
(59.7)

19.6
(41.7)

30.9
(49.6)

0.70

178.1
(312.8)

186.6
(312.0)

199.6
(431.7)

151.0
(175.3)

0.37

Savings per memberb
98.9
US$
(112.2)

72.1
(82.3)

86.1
(121.5)

140.9
(124.2)

7.23c

Savings / total assets
as %

69.3%
(18.9)

Members per SCC

a
b
c

72.3%
(17.0)

70.8%
(16.3)

77.2%
(14.1)

4.07 c

Variable definition provided in Appendix.
Data originally measured in Nepali rupees: US$1 at 78 Nepali rupees
Reject null hypothesis of equal means at the 95% confidence level.

26

Volume 6 Number 1

Community-Based Savings and Credit Cooperatives in Nepal

US$26,000, though total assets for 40% of the SCCs are less than
US$6,500. Average SCC age is five years. The mean values for
membership, assets, and age are not statistically different between
the Hills, Terai, and Kathmandu Valley. SCCs in all three regions
finance the bulk of their assets from member savings. Kathmandu
SCCs are the most dependent on savings (77.2% of total assets),
and Hills SCCs the least dependent (69.3% of total assets). The
mean per-member savings in Hills SCCs (approximately US $72)
is half that in Kathmandu SCCs, suggesting that Hills SCCs are
located in Nepal’s poorest communities.
Because each SCC is locally managed, it is impossible to
provide a general description of financial policies and procedures. However, discussions with SCC managers reveal several
common characteristics. Unlike many MFIs, Nepali SCCs typically provide loans to individuals, not peer groups. Some
SCCs provide consumption loans, while others restrict borrowing to income-generating activities. Membership in the
form of equity shares is usually required to use SCC services.
Many SCCs also require members to participate in a regular
savings plan. Maximum loan amounts are typically calculated
in proportion to individuals’ established savings.
Data limitations prevent any analysis beyond the SCCs’
financial status. Detailed loan data such as delinquency, size,
and duration are unavailable for most SCCs. No data are available
regarding SCC clients’ socioeconomic status. Transportation
and communication infrastructures and other characteristics of
the SCC communities are unknown.

Financial Performance of Nepali SCCs
Nepali SCCs earn strong profits (see Table 2). The mean rate of
return on assets is 3.5%, which exceeds the 2 to 3% recommendation for MFIs from Yaron, McDonald, and Charitonenko
(1998). Profitability is highest for Hills SCCs (4.4%) and lowest
for Kathmandu SCCs (2.2%). Figure 1 further reveals that all
sample SCCs from the Hills earn positive profits, while only
about 85% of SCCs from the Terai and Kathmandu Valley are
Volume 6 Number 1
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profitable. Mean dividend yields on member shares are 19.6%,
which easily exceed the current 5 to 6% yield on commercial
savings accounts (NRB, 2001–2003a). There is no statistical difference in mean dividend yields between regions.
The fact that Hills SCCs are generally more profitable than
SCCs in the Terai and Kathmandu Valley regions is counter

Table 2. Proﬁtability of Nepali SCCs: means grouped by region
Variable

All regions

Profit as %

3.5%
(3.9) b

Hills

Terai

4.4%
(3.2)

3.6%
(5.2)

Kathmandu F–test for
Valley
equality of
means
across
regions
(df=2,184)
2.2%
5.85 a
(3.1)

Dividend yield
19.6%
23.3%
15.3%
18.6%
as %
(37.4)
(31.3)
(20.8)
(51.7)
Note. Variable definitions provided in Appendix.
a
Reject null hypothesis of equal means at the 95% confidence level.
b
Standard deviation in parentheses

0.70

Figure 1. Proﬁtability of Nepali SCCs: Distribution grouped
by region
100%

Distribution

80%
SCC Profit a
above 10%

60%

5 to 10%
0 to 5 %

40%

-5 to 0%
below -5%

20%

Hills
a

Terai

Kathmadu
Valley

Variable definition provided in Appendix.
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intuitive in light of the widespread poverty and difficult geography in the Hills. One possible explanation is that Hills communities may be more committed to their local SCC. First, many
Hills communities remain isolated and ethnically homogeneous, whereas Terai and Kathmandu communities contain significant immigrant populations. Common language and
cultural practices in Hills communities facilitate progress
toward a shared goal. Second, Hills SCCs were more likely conceived independent of donor or government programs, which
creates an increased sense of member ownership. Third, there
are simply fewer MFI alternatives available to poor households
in the Hills. Members realize that no alternative for financial
services is available if the local SCC fails.
Skeptics should rightly ask whether positive profits for
Nepali SCCs are merely the result of widespread subsidies.
Profit alone does not imply financial sustainability, since MFI
financial statements do not necessarily reveal subsidies (Yaron,
1994; Hassan, 2002). If Nepali SCCs are financially sustainable
and not just operationally sustainable, they must show independence from subsidies (Morduch, 1999). Using external loans
as a possible subsidy indicator shows that most Nepali SCCs are
self-reliant since the mean external loan-to-asset ratio is only
5% (see Table 3). Though this ratio is slightly higher for Hills
and Terai SCCs (5.8% compared to 3.5% for Kathmandu
SCCs), use of external funds is still minimal. Figure 2 reveals
that over 60% of all SCCs do not use external loans, and only
15% of all SCCs have external loans exceeding 20% of their
total assets. Furthermore, external loans are not widely subsidized, since mean capital costs, including the interest rate paid
on loans, do not decline for SCCs with higher external loan-toasset ratios (see Figure 2).
Mean profits for women’s and mixed gender SCCs are not
statistically different (see Table 4). If women’s SCCs received
disproportionate subsidies, it would nullify this result, but mean
external loans and capital costs are not statistically different
between each gender category. This finding supports Ashe and
Volume 6 Number 1
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Parrott’s (2002) conclusions regarding women’s savings and
credit groups in the Terai. It also follows evidence found in
other countries that women’s microfinance programs perform at
least as well as men’s and mixed gender programs (Hassan &
Tufte, 2001; Holt & Ribe, 1991).

Table 3. Nepali SCCs’ reliance on external loans: Means
grouped by region
Variable

All regions

External loans payable / 5.0%
total assets as %
(11.5) b
a
b

Hills

5.8%
(12.2)

Terai

5.8%
(11.4)

Kathmandu F–test for
Valley
equality of
means
across
regions
(df=2,184)
3.5%
(10.8)

6.20 a

Reject null hypothesis of equal means at the 95% confidence level.
Standard deviation.

Figure 2. Nepali SCCs’ reliance on external loans, including
mean capital costs: Distribution grouped by region

Distribution

100%

80%

External loans payable/
total assets [mean
capital costs]a

60%

above 20% [8.3%]
10 to 20% [7.5%]
5 to 10% [8.6%]

40%

0 to 5% [7.2%]
no loans [7.0%]

20%

Hills
a

Terai

Kathmadu
Valley

Variable definition provided in Appendix.
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Table 4. Profitability of Nepali SCCs: Means grouped by
gender composition
Variable

Number of SCCs

Mixed gender SCCs Women’s-onlySCCs T-statistic for equality
of means (critical
value 0.05 = 1.97)
168

Profit as %
a

External loans
payable / total
assets as %
Capital costs a as %
a
b

17

3.4%
(3.9) b

4.4%
(4.3)

0.97

5.1%
(11.6)

4.0%
(11.0)

0.41

7.2%
(3.2)

7.6%
(1.8)

0.80

Variable definition provided in Appendix.
Standard deviation

Several other factors may be associated with variations in SCC
profit. Factors such as size and age are exogenous to the SCCs.
Large SCCs possibly incur lower per-unit costs for marketing,
rent, and other items and obtain easier access to financial markets. However, large SCCs may find it difficult to manage
information, and members may experience a reduced sense of
ownership. Older SCCs may earn higher profits due to positive learning-by-doing effects, while SCCs with inadequate
policies and low member participation may experience
decreased profits over time.
Other potential profit factors such as interest rates, administration costs, and reliance on member savings are endogenous
to management decisions. High interest rates on loans receivable
should increase revenue and profit, provided loan demand is
price inelastic. While increased capital costs reduce profit, SCCs
must pay a sufficiently high yield on savings to attract member
deposits. Most importantly, the spread between the effective
interest rate on loans receivable and capital costs must be sufficiently large to cover administration costs. 2 Member savings
provide incentives for increased member ownership and participation and reduced loan delinquency. Savings-led SCCs also
have greater incentive to control administration costs. However,
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because other funds, such as member equity or concessionary
loans, may be less expensive, the a priori relationship between
savings and profit is ambiguous. To investigate the above
effects, the sample SCCs are grouped into profit quartiles and
mean factor values are derived for each quartile (see Table 5).
Table 5 suggests that several factors are not associated with
varying profit levels. Although the most profitable SCCs are
relatively small, the mean asset values between quartiles are not
statistically different. Mean cooperative age also does not differ
statistically between quartiles. These findings for Nepali SCCs
resemble those for the Grameen Bank, where neither age nor
size affect efficiency (Hassan & Tufte, 2001). Similarly, there is
no significant difference between mean quartile values for
administration costs, capital costs, and external loans. It is especially noteworthy that high profits are not associated with
increased external loans or concessionary funds. Nepali SCCs’
mean administration costs are 5% of total assets, which compares
favorably with the 3 to 13% range that Yaron (1994) reports for
other MFIs. This result is surprising since small loan size in poor
communities and difficult topography in the Hills presumably
increase per-unit administration costs. Thus, it appears that
SCCs’ reliance on member savings provides strong incentives for
cost control. Many SCCs also rely on volunteer labor.
For the remaining factors, there are statistically significant
differences between mean quartile values. Member savings are
the primary source of funds for SCCs in all quartiles, though
there are some slight differences. Mean savings-to-asset ratios
exceed 70% in all quartiles, except for the top quartile, at 64.7%. On
average, SCCs in the ﬁrst three quartiles ﬁnance at least 100% of
their loans receivable using member savings; however, this share
declines to 78.9% for the top quartile. In comparison, Richardson
(2001) recommends that SCCs maintain a savings-to-asset ratio
between 70 and 80%, and Yaron (1994) ﬁnds savings-to-loan ratios
in ﬁve successful MFIs ranging from 31 to 110%. Slightly lower
savings occur in the most profitable SCCs due to increased
equity financing. The mean equity-to-asset ratio is almost 30%
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5.0
(2.5)
29.7
(53.7)
13.7
(5.2)
7.6
(3.9)
72.6%
(19.1)
108.4%
(57.5)
8.6%
(15.1)
6.2%
(3.2)
6.2%
(5.7)
15.7%
(10.5)

4.9
(2.4) d
24.8
(52.0)
15.2
(6.2)
7.3
(3.1)
72.3%
(17.0)
97.8%
(38.3)
5.0%
(2.2)

5.6%
(2.4)
5.0%
(4.3)

20.1%
(11.7)

Bottom quartile

15.8%
(7.8)

5.6%
(1.5)
4.6%
(3.0)

5.3
(2.6)
36.8
(81.4)
13.6
(3.7)
6.9
(1.9)
78.7%
(13.5)
103.9%
(26.2)
3.0%
(10.2)

Second quartile

b

a

Variable definition provided in Appendix
Data originally measured in Nepali rupees: US$1 at 78 Nepali rupees
c
Reject null hypothesis of equal means at the 95% confidence level.
d
Standard deviation

Savings / total assets
as %
Savings / loans
receivable as %
External loans
payable / total
assets as %
Interest paid / total
assets a as %
Administration
costs / total
assets a as %
Equity / total
assets a as %

Total assets b,
US$1,000
Effective interest rate
earned on loansa as %
Capital costs a as %

Age, a years

All profit levels

19.4%
(8.1)

6.1%
(2.3)
4.4%
(3.9)

5.2
(2.4)
23.7
(30.7)
17.3
(8.8)
8.0
(3.6)
73.3%
(14.9)
100.4%
(32.4)
4.4%
(10.8)

Third quartile

29.5%
(13.6)

4.6%
(1.9)
4.8%
(4.0)

4.2
(1.9)
9.1
(10.9)
16.1
(5.0)
6.7
(2.5)
64.7%
(17.3)
78.9%
(19.3)
4.0%
(8.5)

Top quartile

Table 5. Potential SCC profit factors: Mean values grouped by profit quartiles

Variable

18.98 c

1.75

4.37 c

2.20

6.01 c

5.87 c

1.75

4.38 c

2.49

2.29

F-statistic for
equal means
across quartiles
(df=3,184)
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for the top quartile and between 15 and 20% for the bottom three
quartiles. The advantage to SCCs of equity financing is reduced
interest expenditures: top quartile SCCs have a mean interest
paid-to-asset ratio of 4.6% compared to 6.2% for the least profitable SCCs. In addition, equity financing provides similar incentives as savings for member participation and ownership.
There is a clear relationship between proﬁt and the interest
earned on loans. High proﬁt SCCs earn 3 to 4 percentage points
more on loans than low proﬁt SCCs. Whether the difference is due
to higher nominal rates, improved loan repayment, or some combination of the two is impossible to know. Given Nepal’s inﬂation
rate of 2 to 4% (NRB, 2001–2003b), high proﬁt SCCs’ real loan
earnings are approximately 12 to 15%, which resemble the upper
range in other successful MFIs (Yaron, 1994).

Discussion and Implications
Nepali SCCs are profitable and show evidence of financial sustainability, while most MFIs worldwide struggle in these areas.
There are several possible explanations. First, nearly all Nepali
SCCs depend on member savings. Savings create incentives for
member participation in SCC activities and decisions. Similarly,
because funds are generated within the local community
(which Bennett et al. [1996] describe as “hot” money), borrowers are motivated to repay loans, and managers to control
costs. Second, because the SCCs are community-based organizations, there are internal loan-monitoring and enforcement
mechanisms. Third, many Nepali SCCs operated for years as
informal savings groups before obtaining formal cooperative
status. 3 Hence, members are familiar with the principles and
challenges of group savings programs.
An important question is whether Nepali SCCs sacrifice
client outreach to achieve financial sustainability. Hassan (2002)
and Navajas, Schreiner, Meyers, and Gonzalez-Vega (2000) suggest
four possible MFI outreach categories: (1) breadth of outreach
refers to the number of clients reached; (2) depth of outreach is the
clients’ socio-economic status; (3) scope of outreach includes
34
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the variety and relevance of microfinance services offered; and
(4) outreach length measures the number of years an MFI provides financial services.
Nepali SCCs do face serious challenges regarding their
breadth and depth of outreach. While savings mobilization in
poor communities is a slow process, MFIs that use external funds
can quickly provide credit to a large number of clients. Internallyfinanced SCCs must also charge sufficiently high interest on loans
to cover all costs, which may deter poor households from borrowing. The problem is exacerbated if SCCs link clients’ credit
availability to their established savings (Rajasekhar, 1996). Despite
these concerns, it is unclear whether Nepali SCCs’ ability to
serve poor households greatly differs from other MFIs. There is
broad consensus that interest rates are only one of many costs
affecting poor households’ demand for credit (Morduch, 1999). In
addition, an assessment of outreach depth should also consider
the number of poor households with access to savings accounts
(Paxton, 2002). Nepali SCCs are strong in this regard. Finally,
many Nepali SCCs serve isolated communities that are not
accessed by other MFIs, thereby expanding both the breadth and
depth of microfinance outreach.
Nepali SCCs’ scope and length of outreach are also quite
strong. The SCCs are significantly ahead of most MFIs in recognizing poor households’ need for convenient savings instruments
(Morduch, 1999). Their strong financial position may enable
expanded client services, such as life and health insurance, in
the future. They should also be able to serve their communities
for many years. In contrast, MFIs that give insufficient priority to sustainability implicitly assume that poor households
need only a one-time injection of cheap credit (Schmidt &
Zeitinger, 1996B).
Findings from this study support the suggestion from Yaron
(1994) and Bennett et al. (1996) that governments and donors
adopt institution-building strategies to promote microfinance
sustainability. There is no evidence that Nepali SCCs need external funding, since they can effectively mobilize local savings even
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in poor, remote communities. Donors should instead provide
support programs through a network organization—such as NEFSCUN—to easily access a large number of SCCs. As part of
these programs NEFSCUN should establish regional service
centers to increase its outreach and effectiveness.
Several specific institution-building strategies stem directly
from this study’s findings. Such programs should emphasize (1)
interest-rate management, (2) record keeping and information
systems, (3) the importance of internal funding, and (4) the
development of new financial products and services. SCC managers need to understand the relationship between interest
rates and profits uncovered in this study. SCCs that perform
poorly should be encouraged to adopt interest-rate policies that
increase profit and savings mobilization. Information systems
must be easy to implement and provide useful information. For
rural Nepali SCCs, this means using manual, double-entry systems, since the infrastructure for computers is inadequate.
However, donors should help devise improved systems that
allow up-to-date loan monitoring. SCCs should be urged to
effectively mobilize and manage internal funds, since external
funds provide no advantages in financial performance. SCCs
that pursue external funds divert attention away from internal
management issues. Donors that offer concessionary funds exacerbate this problem. SCCs with strong financial performance
should be encouraged to provide expanded financial services,
such as insurance and flexible savings plans. SCCs will need
technical assistance in these areas.

Summary and Conclusion
Nepali SCCs earn strong profits and show significant potential
as sustainable microfinance institutions. This is true for all
regions of Nepal, including the Hills. Nepali SCCs are almost
entirely financed via member savings and equity. The rate of
interest earned on loans is a key factor affecting SCC profitability. Nepali SCCs incur low administration costs and
generate significant member savings even in poor, remote
36
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communities. In light of these findings, the government and
donors should adopt microfinance support strategies that build
on SCCs’ ability to mobilize member savings. The government
and donors should give attention to microfinance institution
building and should not provide concessionary funding. While
Nepali SCCs may sacrifice short-term growth and outreach to
achieve financial sustainability, they serve thousands of poor
households in remote areas and provide a variety of microfinance services for the long term.

Appendix
Variable definitions
Variable

Deﬁnition

Age

number of years between the SCC’s most recent ﬁnancial
statement and its legal cooperative registration

Proﬁt

(predividend surplus of revenue - expenditures / total assets

Dividend yielda

(proﬁt x 25%) / member equity

Capital costs

(interest paid on member savings + interest paid on external
loans) / (member savings + external loans)

Effective interest
earned on loans

(interest earned on loans receivable + service earned on loans
fees earned + penalty and other fees) / loans receivable

Equity / total assets

(total member equity + reserve funds) / total assets

Administration
costs / total assets

annual noninterest expenses such as rent, salaries,
supplies, etc. / total assets

Interest paid /
total assets

(annual interest paid on member savings + total annual
interest paid on external loans) / total assets

Nepali cooperative law permits a maximum of 25% of annual profits to be dis
tributed as dividends to members.
a

Notes
The author thanks the entire staff of the Nepal Federation of Savings and Credit
Unions for their cooperation. Lynn Bennett, Carolyn Heggen, Richard Heggen,
Ulrich Wehnert, Richard Yoder, and an anonymous reviewer provided valuable
comments. Avinaya Shah assisted with data compilation. The author prepared
this study while working for the United Mission to Nepal, Kathmandu.
1. This number does not include SCCs that are inactive but have not officially closed or cancelled their NEFSCUN membership.
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2. SCCs should monitor the effective interest rate earned on loans and not
merely the nominal rate. If there are service fees, penalty charges, or high loan
delinquency rates, the nominal and effective rates could differ substantially.
Nominal loan rates are unavailable for the sample SCCs.
3. Before 1992, the number of legally registered SCCs in Nepal was negligible. The Cooperative Act of 1992 simplified the registration process, and many
informal savings groups became legal cooperatives (CECI, 2001).
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